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Abstract 
This paper reviews the current debate on the state of modern macroeconomics from 
methodological standpoint. While some senior figures in economics have argued that modern 
macroeconomics has gone wayward and thus become irrelevant for policy, others argue 
otherwise. Methodologically, the fundamental sources of dispute have centered on realism of 
assumptions, mathematical formalism and empiricism and falsification of economic models. Our 
conclusion from this review is that the observable world upon which macroeconomist rely on to 
make their assumptions, theories and predictions represent a very tiny fraction of physical 
reality. Thus any policy derived from such partial and short sighted analysis can only produce a 
sub-optimal outcome. Moreover, the fundamental analysis employed in macroeconomic analysis 
overlook peculiarities which should be the rule rather than the exception for addressing 
important economic conundrums. In short, although we do not support the position of most 
critics on the view that macroeconomics of the last 30 years is completely useless, we are of the 
view that there is need for serious rethinking about the future of macroeconomics. This is the 
only way forward, if the subject has anything to say about policy. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has been interpreted by many prominent 
economists as a crisis in economics, in particular for macroeconomics. Most of the 
criticisms have focused on the assumptions of macroeconomic models, the 
inability of these theories and models to deal with the financial crisis and the 
consequent spillover effects for the whole economy and on global a scale. Leading 
macroeconomists like Acemoglu (2009), Buiter (2009), Eichengren (2009), de 
Grauwe (2009), Krugman (2009), Spaventa (2009), Stiglitz (2009) and Wyplosz 
(2009) indicate that a serious soul searching amongst macroeconomists is taking 
place. The criticisms of macroeconomics have come not only from mainstream 
academic and professional economists, but also political and opinion leaders. 
Notable in this category is Her Majesty the Queen of England. The Queen is 
quoted to have asked her economic advisers when she visited the London School 
of Economics “Why didn’t you tell us?”  
The objective of this paper is to undertake a critical review of the position of 
key figures in macroeconomics on the current state of macroeconomics, and to put 
forward a fundamental proposition for examining the world in a more holistic way 
than how the subject matter has conceived of it in the past. Among other things, the 
central discussions  focusses on the various criticisms of modern macroeconomics 
and the response to such criticisms, and our suggestion and proposition for 
economists to look deeper into the nature of reality, than the illusive world of 
theory and models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses 
the key criticisms that have been leveled against modern macroeconomics by some 
leading macroeconomists. Section 3 presents and discusses the major responses to 
the attack on the state of modern macroeconomic research and policy. The final 
section of the paper presents the key conclusions and discussions of the major 
issues discussed as well as the future of macroeconomics. 
 
2. Criticisms of modern macroeconomics 
The recent attack on macroeconomics is not all that surprising. The subject 
macroeconomics was born and baptized in crisis time and hence has always been 
called upon to renew its faith in times of crisis. The Great Depression transformed 
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economics and led to macroeconomics as autonomous field of study. 
Macroeconomics as we know it today was the results of reaction to the body of 
economic thinking prior to the publication of Keynes’ General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money in 1936. Thus, it was the Great Depression of the 
1930s that resulted in a paradigm shift in the functioning of the economy as a 
whole and as a result gave birth to Macroeconomics. The agenda of 
macroeconomics is, to a greater extent than that of microeconomics, determined by 
factors outside the discipline. For instance, macroeconomics has to provide 
diagnoses and remedies for problems such as unemployment, inflation, 
productivity slowdowns and financial crashes, whether or not these are the topics 
that, from a scientific point of view, are the ones the discipline is best equipped to 
tackle. Since its inception, the subject has received attacks and a need for 
rethinking anytime economic crisis raises its ugly head. For instance, the 
stagflation of the 1970s ended the great debate between “Keynesians” and 
“monetarists” in favour of Friedman’s rules, and set the stage for the rise of a 
succession of increasingly silly theories rooted in pre-Keynesian thought (Wray; 
2011).  Woodford (1999) and Blanchard (2000) gave good accounts of how 
macroeconomics has evolved since the beginning of the third decade of the 20
th
 
Century. Woodford (1999) for instance discusses his paper along the following 
evolutionary phases: the birth of macroeconomics; the Keynesian revolution; the 
neoclassical synthesis; the great inflation and the Crisis of Keynesian economics; 
Monetarism; rational expectations and the new classical economics; real business 
cycle theory; a new neoclassical synthesis. In most of the cases these shifts of 
emphasis about how we should go about macroeconomic research and policy are 
motivated by severe economic crisis which reveal the inadequacies in the body of 
knowledge existing at the time. On his turn, Blanchard (2000) traced out the 
history of macroeconomics into three epochs. 
Pre-1940: a period of exploration, where macroeconomics was not 
macroeconomics yet, but monetary theory on one side and real business cycle 
theory on the other. 
From 1940-1980: period of consolidation-a period during which and 
integrated framework was developed, starting with the IS-LM, all the way to 
dynamic general equilibrium models. 
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Since 1980: a new period of exploration, focused on the role of imperfections 
in macroeconomics, the relevance on nominal wage and price setting, 
incompleteness of markets, asymmetric information, search and bargaining in 
decentralized markets, to increasing returns in production. 
Our favourite starting point is Backhouse and Salanti (1999) who raised three 
important methodological questions that are relevant to the present paper:  
 Can macroeconomic theories be tested? 
 Do macroeconomic theories change in response to evidence? 
 Is macroeconomics in a healthy state from methodological point of view? 
Much of the ensuing discussions here focus on the last question. MaCallum 
(1999) argues explicitly that, contrary to what critics have claimed, it is an illusion 
to believe that macroeconomics is itself in poor condition in relation to 
microeconomics. He maintains that this illusion is created by the much more 
ambitious agenda that is set for applied macroeconomics than for applied 
microeconomics. Confirming that macroeconomics is in a good methodological 
state, Blanchard (2009) concluded that the state of macroeconomics is good. 
However, the position that the state of macroeconomics is good is not a consensus 
one. There have been brutal criticisms from many senior economists about the 
current approach to macroeconomics.  
One of the most popular economists who have criticized modern 
macroeconomics following the recent financial crisis is Paul Krugman (the 2008 
noble prize winner in economic sciences). Writing in the September 6
th
, 2009 
edition of the New York Times (06/09 NYT), Krugman argues that the economics 
profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in 
impressive looking mathematics, for truth.  The following quote from the 06/09 
NYT publication add further dimensions to the attack on modern macroeconomics 
by Krugman. 
 
“Until the Great Depression, most economists clung to a vision of capitalism as 
a perfect or nearly perfect system. That vision wasn’t sustainable in the face of mass 
unemployment, but as memories of the Depression faded, economists fell back in 
love with the old, idealized vision of an economy in which rational individuals 
interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up with fancy equations. The renewed 
romance with the idealized market was, to be sure, partly a response to shifting 
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political winds, partly a response to financial incentives. … the central cause of the 
profession’s failure was the desire for all-encompassing, intellectually elegant 
approach that also gave economists the chance to show off their mathematical 
prowess.”  
 
Krugman further argues that economists over the years have turned a blind 
eye to the limitations of human rationality that often led to bubbles and busts; to 
the problems of institutions that run amok; to imperfections of markets, 
particularly the financial markets, that can cause the economy to undergo sudden, 
unpredictable crashes; and to the dangers created when regulators do not believe in 
regulation.  
From the foregoing, we can group the main criticisms of Krugman under the 
following headings: over reliance on mathematics, ignoring market imperfections 
in preference for perfect markets in macro modeling; rational expectations and the 
associated efficient market hypothesis and deregulation, among others.  
De Grauwe(2009), in VOX Europe, argued in favour of the bottom-up 
approach versus top-down approach to macroeconomics [see also De Grauwe 
(2010)]. De Grauwe specifically cited the rational expectations flavored dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model as a proto-typical example of top-
down approach to macroeconomics. His criticism to the top-down approach to 
macro modeling in general and rational expectations assumption in particular, and 
his preference for the bottom-up approach is summarized by the following quote: 
 
“The extraordinary assumptions of macroeconomic models have left the 
outside world perplexed about what economists have been doing during the last few 
decades. This column contrasts the incongruous rational expectations top-down 
model with a bottom-up model where no individual is capable of understanding the 
full complexity of a market system. The bottom up model creates correlations in 
beliefs that generate waves of optimism and pessimism. The latter produce 
endogenous business cycles akin to the Keynesian “animal spirits”.”  
 
The attack of De Grauwe on modern macroeconomics thus centered on macro 
models that rely on the rational expectations .The agents in the these models have 
incredible cognitive abilities – they are able to understand the complexities of the 
world, and they figure out the probability distributions of all the shocks that can hit 
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the economy (De Grauwe; 19/11/2009). This is clearly an untenable assumption 
that no one should take serious. Unfortunately this damaging assumption of 
rational expectations has become the bedrock of modern macroeconomics. The 
workhorse model of modern macroeconomics, the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium, is highly rooted in the assumption of rational expectations. 
Wray (2011) castigated modern macroeconomics as summarized by the 
following quote: 
 
“The global crisis exploded reigning orthodoxy. Among those theories and 
claims that should no longer be taken seriously by any macroeconomist we must 
include: rational expectations and continuous market clearing; new classical and real 
business cycle approaches; neutral money; the new monetary consensus, the Taylor 
rule, and the Great Moderation; the efficient market hypothesis; Ricardian 
equivalence and other versions of policy irrelevance doctrine; and claims made by 
advocates of deregulation and self-regulation. None of these ideas should be taught 
in any serious economics course – they are no more relevant to economic theory than 
are bloodletting techniques to the study of medicine.”(Wray, 2011) 
 
These bashings on modern macroeconomics by Wray differs from that of 
Krugman only in the tone of their voices. They both show no hope in the current 
practice of macroeconomics. To them a serious rethinking about the way 
macroeconomics should conducted now and in the future is crucial. 
Caballero (2010) makes an important distinction between “the core” and “the 
periphery” of macroeconomics, and launched an attack on the current practice of 
the former in praises for the latter.  Caballero (2010) identifies the periphery of 
macroeconomics as that part of macroeconomics that has focused on the details of 
the sub-problems and mechanisms but has downplayed distant and complex 
general equilibrium interactions. The core has focused on extremely stylized 
versions of general equilibrium interactions while downplaying on the sub-
problems. His main reference here was on the DSGE modeling approach to 
macroeconomics. Caballero (2010), whiles chastising the core of macroeconomics 
sang praises for the periphery. This quote summarizes his attack on the core of 
modern macroeconomics: 
“…is that its current core – by which I mainly mean the so-called dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium approach – has become so mesmerized with its own 
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internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved in its own 
world with the precision about the real one. This is dangerous for both 
methodological and policy reasons. On methodology front, macroeconomic research 
has been in “fine-tuning” mode with the local-maximum of the dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium world, when we should be in “broad-exploration” mode. … 
The periphery of macroeconomics has proven to be more useful than the macro 
machine-building mode of the core to help our understanding of significant 
macroeconomic events. For example, in the context of the current financial and 
economic crisis, the periphery gave us framework to understand phenomenon such as 
speculative bubbles, leverage cycles, fire sales, flight to equity, margin-and 
collateral-constraint spirals, liquidity runs, and so on – a phenomenon that played a 
central role in bringing the world economy to the brink of a severe depression.”  
 
Again, Caballero’s criticisms were mainly directed at the new Classical and 
New Keynesian macroeconomics, particularly, the rational expectations and the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. The main argument against the 
DSGE model is that the model is overly simplistic, focus only around the steady 
state. Can we guarantee the economy is always operating in the neighborhood of 
the steady state? There is no assurance except by belief similar to the belief in 
heaven and hell by Christians. This is the source of prediction failures in modern 
macroeconomics. 
Robert Solow of MIT entered the debate and criticized modern 
macroeconomics in his prepared statement on July 2010 on the theme “Building a 
Science of Economics for the Real World” presented to the House committee on 
Science and Technology. In his statement Solow (2010) lamented: 
 
“Here we are, still near the bottom of a deep and prolonged recession, with the 
immediate future uncertain, desperately short of jobs, and the approach to 
macroeconomics that dominates serious thinking, certainly in our elite universities 
and in many central banks and other influential policy circles, seems to have 
absolutely nothing to say about the problem. Not only does it offer no guidance, it 
really seems to have nothing useful to say.” 
 
Solow (2010) argues that when it comes to matters as important as 
macroeconomics, we must insist that every proposition must pass the smell test: 
does this really make sense? He maintains that the current popular DSGE models 
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do not pass the smell test. The DSGE model has nothing useful to say about anti-
recession policy because it has built into its essentially implausible assumptions 
the conclusion that there is nothing for macroeconomic policy to do.  
 
3. Key responses to the criticisms  
Indeed as no revolution go without resistance, many senior figures in 
economics have formally or informally responded to the various criticisms that 
have been leveled against modern macroeconomics. In this section of the paper, we 
present the key response to the various criticisms leveled against modern 
macroeconomics presented in the previous section.  
In his response to the criticisms of modern macroeconomics, Wickens (2010) 
grouped his defense of modern macroeconomics under the following headings: 
abstraction and formality; rational expectations; macroeconomic Shocks; modern 
macroeconomics and traditional econometrics and finance. Recall from the 
previous section that one of the points that Krugman raised against modern 
macroeconomics is it’s over reliance on mathematics. In particular, it has been 
firmly argued that abstraction and the use of mathematics, has caused 
macroeconomics to take a wrong path compared with the informal wisdom of 
economics of Keynes who brought up on Marshall’s methodology deliberately 
eschewed the use of mathematics. In his reaction to this criticism, Wickens (2010) 
maintain that these are old criticisms of macroeconomics which extend to 
economics in general and hence surprising that they should be resurrected once 
more as an explanation of the recent financial crisis. He argues further that the use 
of mathematics is easily justified: it simply ensures that the logic of the argument 
is carried out correctly.  
An assumption that has received brutal attack is the rational expectations. In 
defending this assumption, Wickens (2010), first acknowledges that it is difficult 
that any economist, including modern macroeconomists, believe that people are 
completely rational. He however, maintains that the attraction of the rational 
expectations was that it implied that current errors could not be predicted from past 
errors. Further, it also enabled expectations formation to be placed on equal footing 
as most other economic decisions. A related hypothesis to the rational expectations 
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that has received much of the blame for the recent financial crisis is the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). For instance Mr. Krugman maintains that 
“the EMH asserts that financial markets always get asset prices right given the 
available information where as many real-world investors bear little resemblance to 
the cool calculators of efficient-market theory: they are all too subject to herd 
behaviour, to bouts of irrational exuberance and unwarranted panic. Wickens (2010) 
however, argues that these criticisms of the EMH are dangerously simplistic as they 
ignore the many qualifications made in the EMH that are required for its prediction 
that market prices all assets correctly.  
 
Another senior economist that has responded to the criticisms of modern 
macroeconomics is Chicago based economist, John Cochrane. Cochrane 
(19/09/2009) directed his responses specifically to the points raised against 
macroeconomics by Paul Krugman. Cochrane organized his reaction specifically 
around the efficient market hypothesis, fiscal stimulus, the financial crisis and the 
future of economics. With regards to the efficient market hypothesis, his defense 
was that:  
 
“It’s fun to say that we didn’t see the crisis coming, but the central empirical 
prediction of the efficient markets hypothesis is precisely that nobody can tell where 
markets are going – neither benevolent government bureaucrats, nor crafty hedge-
fund managers, nor ivory-tower academics. This is probably the best-tested 
proposition in all the social sciences.” 
 
With regards to fiscal stimulus, Cochrane argues that nobody ever asserted 
that an increase in government spending cannot, under any circumstances, increase 
employment. He maintains that Krugman’s allegation is unsupported by any 
serious review of professional writings. On the causes of the financial crisis, 
Cochrane argues that Krugman has absolutely no idea about what caused the 
financial crisis, what policies might have prevented it, and what policies we should 
adopt in going forward. 
On the future of economics, Cochrane’s position is that the changes suggested 
by Krugman are incompatible. His first point here was in relation to Krugman’s 
suggestion that future models of macroeconomics should recognizes flaws and 
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frictions and incorporates alternative assumptions about behaviour, especially 
towards risk-taking. Cochrane’s reaction to this is: 
 
“Hello, Paul, where have you been for the last 30 years? Macroeconomists 
have not spent 30 years admiring the eternal verities of Kydland and Prescott’s 1982 
paper. Pretty much all we have been doing for 30 years is introducing flaws, frictions 
and new behaviours, especially new models of attitudes to risk and comparing the 
resulting model quantitatively , to data.  
 
On Krugman’s suggestion of a return to Keynesianism, this is what Cochrane 
has to say: 
“Krugman argues that a more or less Keynesian view is the only plausible 
game in town and Keynesian economics remains the best framework we have for 
making sense of recessions and depressions. One thing is pretty clear by now, that 
when economics incorporates flaws and frictions, the result will not be to rehabilitate 
an 80 year old book. As Paul bemoans, the new Keynesians who did just what he 
asks, putting Keynes inspired price-stickiness into logically coherent models, ended 
up with something that looked a lot more like monetarism.” 
 
Cochrane’s last response to Krugman’s suggestions is in relation to the use of 
mathematics in economics. In his defense for the use of mathematics in economics, 
Cochrane argues that mathematics in economics serves to keep the logic straight, 
to make sure that the “then” really does follow the “if”, which it is so frequently 




4. Conclusion and discussions 
From the presentation above, we could summarize the main arguments under 
the following methodological headings: realism of assumptions, mathematical 
formalism and empiricism and falsification. The criticisms of the rational 
expectations hypothesis and the efficient market model that have received much of 
the blame of the recent financial and economic crisis have centered on their 
unrealistic assumptions. Similarly, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
model has been attacked on its stylized assumptions and excessive abstraction from 
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reality. In particular the model has no role for financial markets and banks in 
general. The problem that it poses here is that the model does not capture how 
shocks to financial markets transmit to the rest of the economy. Neither can the 
model tell how real shock (productivity/technology shocks) will affect the financial 
sector and its feedback nodes. These are clear methodological limitations to these 
models concerning their assumptions and the degree of abstraction. The question 
of whether realism of assumption matter plays a role here. To buttress this point we 
quote from Stiglitz (2009): 
 
“As the depression faded into distant memory, the economics profession lost 
sight of these lessons. Dogmas and doctrines holding that markets worked well and 
that they were self-correcting once again came to predominate. This time, the 
theories were more sophisticated, but the underlying assumptions were equally 
irrelevant. These ideas helped shaped the intellectual milieu which gave rise to the 
flawed policies, in turn, gave rise to the crisis.” 
 
Stiglitz (2009) argued further that the models that have predominated within 
macroeconomics, which assume representative agents with rational expectations, 
are particularly disturbing.  
“The representative agent models ignore the rich diversity of our economy – a 
diversity that is at the heart of some of the problems it faces. An economy with a 
single individual has no lenders and no borrowers, no problems of asymmetric 
information, no need for banks, no need to ascertain creditworthiness – in short, is 
missing everything that is important. Remarkably, most of the economics profession 
focused on models that have almost nothing to say about the crisis we are facing. 
Stiglitz (2009)”. 
 
Another central area of fundamental dispute with regards to the current state 
of modern macroeconomics is mathematical formalism. This point was particularly 
raised by Paul Krugman. This criticism has been well responded to, for instance by 
John Cochrane of Chicago, arguing that the mathematics gets the logic straight 
better than writing in prose. This is generally true for general economics. 
Macroeconomics needs a particular consideration on the over reliance on 
mathematics. Rigorous mathematics in macro models breaks communication 
between the academic macroeconomist and the policy maker. The claim that it was 
the failure to use modern macroeconomics rather than its use by Wickens (2010) 
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that led to the financial and economic crisis calls for worry here. If indeed policy 
makers drop the prescriptions from modern macroeconomics from their tool kits, it 
could probably be due to the fact that the macroeconomists were speaking a 
strange language to policy makers.  While we aim at logical consistency and 
clarity, we should concurrently ensure that policy makers do understand the 
language. While mathematical formalism leads to consistency and precision in 
economic analysis, it equally loses contact with the reality when the esoteric details 
of formulations are emphasized over the more important areas of policy.  Clower 
(1995) expressed this concern by distinguishing between the real world and models 
world. The question then is whether propositions derived from the model are of use 
to real world and hence has any policy relevance. Summers (1991), has claimed 
that informal empirical methods have had far more impact on macroeconomics 
than the results of any formal econometric models. And according to Keynes “It's 
better to be roughly right than precisely wrong”. 
Last but not the least, criticisms of modern macroeconomics and the response 
to such criticisms has centered also around empiricism and falsification of modern 
macroeconomic models. Critics of macroeconomics have argued that predictions 
of modern macroeconomic models are contradicted by empirical observation. 
Macroeconomists as a group, looking through their elegant rational expectations 
dressed up in the so-called New-Keynesian Macroeconomics with DSGE as its 
workhorse could not sense any bad times ahead until the crisis struck deep.  
Juselius (1999) argues that to confront models with evidence, model formulation is 
paramount. Thus the traditional approach of formulating deterministic models with 
incorporation of error terms for purposes of inferences on parameter values should 
be ditched for stochastic formulations. The above sources of dispute – unrealistic 
assumptions, mathematical formalism and falsification of macroeconomic theories 
– are in fact nested. The use of mathematics requires simplifying, often unrealistic 
assumptions. Much of important aspects of real world economic system are cutoff 
in mathematical model building, as is typical of DSGE model and representative 
agent models in general. With these high levels of abstractions and bogus 
assumptions and hypothesis like rational expectations, market efficiency and 
invisible hand, there was no way such models could predict real world economic 
phenomenon. If modern macroeconomists predicted anything correct, it was only 
in the class room, not in the policy arena; their models have no place there. Modern 
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macroeconomics is only good for mental exercises; its policy relevance is in high 
disrepute.  What we call predictions in macroeconomics take place ex-post. The 
subject has therefore no solution to the nature and quality of any crisis in the now 
and future. There is thus the need for serious rethinking of the future of 
macroeconomics if its relevance to policy is to be maintained. 
Even within the quagmire of an economic crisis, there are fewer consensuses 
regarding what should be the appropriate policy to rising debt levels, smoothing 
business cycles and correcting failures in the market system. This is very well 
encapsulated by George Bernard Shaw’s insight that “if economist were laid end to 
end, they would not reach a conclusion”. The key to explaining this however, lies 
in the fundamental distinction between reality and illusion, and this in turn is a 
function of perception. We can obviously take the middle way by saying that 
because of differences in scientific judgment and values, some disagreements 
among macroeconomist are inevitable. However, that leaves the question only 
partially addressed. Perception is a function of the perceiver, in this case the 
macroeconomist. And each individual macroeconomist can only perceive a very 
limited expanse of what is perceivable, hence limiting the extent of awareness 
possible within an endless stream of consciousness. Every thought of the 
macroeconomist thus only makes up some segment of the world that s/he sees. It is 
with these thoughts, then, that macroeconomists tend to work with and to change 
the world implies a change in the perception of the world. To this end we can say 
perception is very consistent. What the macroeconomist sees reflects his/her 
thinking. Thus all models and policy prescription must of necessity arise from the 
particular way in which any given economist views the world. Yet, over time, it 
has become the norm to view macroeconomic models and policies as omnibus and 
very much applicable to large sections of society and countries, and in fact the 
world. It is therefore not an overstatement to conclude that most of what we have 
come to consider as models and policy are nothing but mere aberration’s in the 
minds of macroeconomists. A belief in non-exist phenomenon can have no bearing 
at all on what is real. Our main point therefore is that mainstream formulation, 
modeling, forecasting and policy prescriptions have always been based on these 
very narrow perceptions of reality. 
The other strand of our argument is that mainstream macroeconomics lack 
self-knowledge: knowledge beyond the external events and their underlying 
 
© 2012 The author(s). African Review of Economics and Finance, Vol 4, No. 1, Dec 2012. 86 
 
internal impulses that give rise to the concepts and phenomena macroeconomists 
study. This is where economics, psychology and philosophy must look for answers 
to all crisis situations such as the current one. As C.J Jung argues in the 
Undiscovered Self (Jung, 1958), most macroeconomist confuse real knowledge of 
the economy with what illusion present as real. And it is not uncommon to assume 
without any challenge that what rational thinkers prescribe for the world is all there 
is to know. Thus in the main, macroeconomist spend their time interacting with 
very subjective and unconscious elements of their petty minds without recourse to 
the underlying impulses that gave birth to those elements. The totality of what 
gives rise to national income, exchange rate dynamics, financial development 
among other issues in economics are for the most part hidden from economist who 
analyses and theorize about them. Not only this, but also most of the totality of the 
events surrounding the macroeconomist is completely unknown to him. What is 
commonly called knowledge in economics and related disciplines is therefore a 
very limited knowledge and most of it dependent on social factors of what is 
already known by our limited perception. The proof of this is seen in the countless 
repetition of the same cyclical events in the economy with exact precision with 
only minor changes within the time-space paradigm.  
Self-knowledge is what macroeconomics need and this involves getting to 
know individual facts. In this respect theory, models and concepts are of little help. 
For the more a theory or model lay claim to universal validity, the less capable it is 
of doing justice to individual facts. Any theory based on experience is necessarily 
statistical; that is to say it formulates an ideal average which abolishes all 
exceptions at either end of the scale and replaces them by an abstract mean. This 
mean may be quite valid but it need not necessarily occur in reality. Despite this it 
figures in macroeconomic theory as an unassailable fundamental fact. The 
exceptions on either extreme, though equally factual, do not appear in the final 
result at all, since they cancel each other out (see Jung, 1958).  
The statistical method shows the facts in the light of the ideal average but 
does not give us a picture of their empirical reality. While reflecting an 
indisputable aspect of reality, it can falsify the actual truth in a most misleading 
way. This is true of theories which are based on statistics and econometrics and the 
corresponding forecasts and policy arising from them. The distinctive thing about 
real facts, however, is their individuality. Not to put too fine a point on it, one 
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could say that the real picture consists of nothing but exceptions to the rule, and 
that, in consequence, absolute reality has predominantly the character of 
irregularity. These considerations must be borne in mind whenever there is talk of 
theory serving as a guide to policy. There is, and can be no self-knowledge based 
on theoretical assumptions, for the object of self-knowledge is an individual—a 
relative exception and irregular phenomena. Hence it is not the universal and the 
regular that characterize the individual but rather the unique. 
Our conclusion from this review is that, though we do not support the position 
of most critics on the view that macroeconomics of the last 30 years is completely 
useless, we are of the view that there is need for serious rethinking about the future 
of macroeconomics. This is the only way forward, if the subject has anything to 
say about policy. 
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